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ABSTRACT
The proper method for translating Spanish and Portuguese civil
law concepts into English was a topic of debate among civil law
scholars and comparatists at the turn of the last century. This article
examines the translation approaches of three Americans (Clifford
Walton, F.L. Joannini, and Joseph Wheless) who independently
translated the Spanish, Colombian, Argentine, and Brazilian Civil
Codes during the period 1899-1920. Specifically, Walton’s (1899)
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Spanish Civil Code translation’s use of common law English is contrasted with Joannini’s Colombian (1905) and Argentine (1917)
Civil Codes translations’ preference for a “civilian” legal lexicon,
including substantial borrowing from the special civil law English
vocabulary of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Joannini’s as well as Wheless’s use of civilian terminology received mixed reviews in law journals. Disagreement among comparatists about the translators’ methods is explored below and
placed within the context of contemporary English-speaking scholarly paradigms of civil law-common law difference, including attitudes to civilian terminology. The article concludes with observations about the role of intellectual history and political crosscurrents—especially the creation of new mixed legal systems during the
19th and early 20th centuries—in shaping English and American
attitudes to the civil law tradition in general and to legal translation
in particular.
Keywords: legal translation, civil code, Spanish civil law, Spanish
craze
I. INTRODUCTION
The translation of civil law terms and concepts into English is
an inherently comparatist activity with challenges that are well-recognized by civil law scholars and legal translators. 1 These challenges were particularly apparent during the first quarter of the 20th
1. See H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY & RESEARCH 117-18 (2d ed., Cambridge U. Press 1949) (“The greatest strain [in legal translation] is naturally experienced by a lawyer who passes from a legal language of the Continent of Europe,
founded to a large extent on the phraseology of Roman law, to the curious and for
the most part unscientific terminology of Anglo-American law.”); Edgardo Rotman, The Inherent Problems of Legal Translation: Theoretical Aspects, 6 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 189 (1995) (“To translate a text from the language
of a civil law country to the language of another civil law country is generally less
complicated than to translate the same text to the language of a common law country.”); see also Olivier Moréteau, Les frontières de la langue et du droit : vers une
méthodologie de la traduction juridique, 61 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPARÉ 695, 706-09 (2009) (describing various problems of translation in comparative law, particularly translations across the civil law-common law divide);
Alain Levasseur & Vicenç Feliú, The English Fox in the Louisiana Civil Law
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century, as the U.S. War Department and the new Comparative Law
Bureau sponsored the publication of multiple Spanish-English civil
code translations for use in the country’s new mixed legal systems
or for comparative study of South American law. Perhaps the most
noteworthy Spanish-English civil code translation of the period was
F.L. Joannini’s Colombian Civil Code, which he translated for the
Panama Canal Zone’s de facto government, the Isthmian Canal
Commission, in 1905.2 Tasked with translating Colombian civil law
terms and concepts into English for the use of Zone officials and
territorial judges, Joannini relied heavily on civilian vocabularies,
including the special legal lexicon of the Louisiana Civil Code, rather than the legal English of the common law. As a result, Louisiana
civil law terms such as acquets and gains, lesion beyond moiety, and
benefit of discussion all made their unexpected lexical debut on the
Isthmus of Panama. 3
Not every translator of the period was so sensitive to civilian
terminology. When Clifford Walton translated the Spanish Civil
Code for the War Department’s use in Cuba in 1899, the U.S. Army
lawyer largely embraced common law terminology to render civil
law concepts into English. Thus, in Walton’s translation, trespass,
fee simple, and easement are used while civil law terms are uncommon. 4 Joannini’s special emphasis on civilian English was therefore
far from being the universal practice at the turn of the last century.
Joannini nevertheless favored civil law English vocabularies in a

Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English Language; Comparatists Beware!, 69 LA. L. REV. 715, 735 (2009) (stating that translation of French civil law
terms into legal English inherently obscures “the original and only authentic understanding” of the civilian concept being translated).
2. See THE CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA AND AMENDATORY
LAWS CONTINUED IN FORCE IN THE CANAL ZONE… (Frank L. Joannini trans.,
Isthmian Canal Commission 1905) [hereinafter, Col. Civ. C.]. As Joannini translated directly from the Colombian Civil Code of 1887, this article refers to his
translation as the Colombian (rather than Panamanian) code.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See infra Part II.A.
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subsequent translation of the Argentine Civil Code of 1871 (published by the Bureau in 1917), 5 as did another American, Joseph
Wheless, in his translation of the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916 (completed in 1920). 6 Joannini’s Colombian Civil Code translation remained a primary source of private law in the Canal Zone until its
repeal in 1933, while both Joannini’s and Wheless’s translations of
the Argentine and Brazilian Civil Codes remained the principal English translations well into the 20th century. 7
While Walton’s translation largely escaped criticism, Joannini’s
and Wheless’s preference for civilian vocabularies received mixed
reviews in law journals, with some legal scholars arguing that their
method of translation preserved unnecessary distinctions of terminology between legal systems. 8 Such criticism likely reflected
widely held beliefs among late 19th and early 20th centuries civil
law scholars and comparatists, who tended to emphasize the similarity of the world’s two great legal traditions, the civil law and the
common law. Indeed, many contemporary scholars argued that the
two traditions were growing increasingly alike and that remaining
differences were primarily distinctions of procedure and terminology, rather than substance. Moreover, the creation of new mixed legal systems vindicated predictions of global convergence as American colonial judges in Puerto Rico and the Philippines boasted that
the two traditions were blending in their courtrooms without incident, and Pan-Americanism’s emphasis on uniform legislation for
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. See infra Part II.D.
7. See John O. Collins, Canal Zone Changes to Common Law System, 20
A.B.A. J. 233 (1934) (discussing repeal of Colombian Civil Code in Zone);
Charles Szladits, Notes on Translations of Foreign Civil and Commercial Codes,
3 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 70 & nn.29-33 (1954) (listing Joannini & Wheless as primary English translations available); Ricardo J. Navarro, A Bibliography of Latin
American Law: Primary and Secondary Sources in English, 19 TEX. INT’L L.J.
133, 140-41 (1984) (same listing thirty years later).
8. Layton B. Register, The Argentine Civil Code Together with Constitution
and Law of Civil Registry, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 180, 182 (1918) (book review); E.G.
Lorenzen, The Civil Code of Brazil, 30 YALE L.J. 652, 652 (1921) (book review);
Max Radin, The Civil Code of Brazil, 9 CAL. L. REV. 443, 444 (1921) (book review).
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the Americas likewise created ideological incentives for overcoming civil law-common law difference with technical (i.e., comparative) solutions.9 In this context, Joannini’s creative translation approach, sensitive as it was to civil law-common law difference, appears at odds with strong, identifiable trends in early 20th century
American legal thought, and it is easy to understand why civil law
scholars and comparatists esteemed translations that presented civil
law concepts in legal English (such as Walton’s) and criticized those
that preserved the subtle lexical nuances of the two traditions (such
as Joannini’s).
As several scholars have noted, comparative law’s assumptions
and methods have often been influenced by contemporary cultural
and political developments, and this article argues that early 20th
century American legal comparison was no exception. 10 Joannini’s
Spanish-English civil code translations, and the debates which they
generated among comparatists and civil law scholars, provide valuable insight into the role that intellectual history and global political
developments played in shaping early 20th century English and
American attitudes to the civil law tradition in general and to the art
of legal translation in particular.
Having reviewed the historical context of Spanish-English civil
code translations in Part I, this article continues in Part II with descriptions of four civil code translations from the period and the individual translators’ different approaches to civilian terminology.
Part III examines contemporary scholars’ mixed reviews of two of
the four translations, while Part IV places negative reviews of the

9. See infra Part IV.
10. See, e.g., Esin Örücü, Something Old, Something New in Comparative
Law, 2 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 324, 324-27 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he history of
comparative law runs parallel with the history of ideas” and briefly tracing development of discipline against trends in European thought); Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXF. J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 109-10
(1989) (stating that “[t]hroughout this century trends in comparative law have
been effected by world political events” and arguing that surrounding “political
climate has a pervasive influence” on comparatist assumptions).
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translators’ preference for civilian vocabularies into broader perspective by analyzing early 20th century expectations of legal convergence and contemporary comparatist assumptions about the future of civilian vocabularies. Part V concludes with a discussion of
the influence of political ideology on common law attitudes to the
civil law, with a special focus on the role of mixed systems, including Louisiana, in the survival of “civilian English.”
II. BACKGROUND TO SPANISH-ENGLISH CIVIL CODE TRANSLATIONS
(1899-1917)
Though mostly forgotten today, political developments at the
turn of the last century brought the Hispanic world’s civil law systems to the attention of American comparative law scholars at a critical moment in the discipline’s development. Specifically, the creation of new mixed legal systems in Spain’s former colonies of
Puerto Rico and the Philippines brought American colonial judges
and civil law scholars into sustained contact with Spanish civil law.
This process repeated itself on a smaller scale in the Canal Zone,
which the United States had acquired in 1904 in order to complete
construction of the transoceanic Panama Canal. 11 At the same time,
American business expansion in Latin America spurred widespread

11. See, e.g., JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, EL CHOQUE DE DOS CULTURAS JURÍDICAS
EN PUERTO RICO (1991) (examining the gradual introduction of common law doctrines into private law jurisprudence of Puerto Rico by American colonial judges
during early decades of island’s mixed legal system); Manuel Rodríguez Ramos,
Interaction of Civil Law and Anglo-American Law in the Legal Method of Puerto
Rico, 23 TUL. L. REV. 1, 1-22 (1948) (discussing the creation of mixed system in
Puerto Rico); WINFRED LEE THOMPSON, INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN LAW IN
THE PHILIPPINES AND PUERTO RICO (U. of Arkansas Press 1989) (reviewing the
creation of mixed legal system in American-controlled Philippines after SpanishAmerican War); WAYNE D. BRAY, THE COMMON LAW ZONE IN PANAMA: A CASE
STUDY IN RECEPTION 94-122 (Inter American U. Press 1977) (documenting the
development of mixed system in Canal Zone as well as gradual replacement of
Colombian private law in Zone between 1904-1933). For a brief overview of these
mixed systems’ early development, see also Luis Muñiz-Argüelles, Puerto Rico,
in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 381-93 (2d
ed., Vernon Valentine Palmer ed. 2012) [hereinafter MIXED JURISDICTIONS
WORLDWIDE]; Pacifico Agabin, The Philippines, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS
WORLDWIDE at 452-80.
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enthusiasm for the Pan-American movement’s promise of uniform
commercial law. 12 Over two decades, Pan-Americanism and legal
mixing in the new insular possessions proved to be reliable catalysts
for American comparison, as colonial judges applied both Spanish
civil law and American public law in territorial courtrooms, influential law professors debated civil law-common law difference, and
both groups speculated freely about the future relationship between
the two legal traditions. As a result, American legal scholars produced a steady stream of literature concerning Spain and Latin
America’s legal systems, introduced new courses on Spanish civil
law at leading law schools, and widened opportunities for further
comparison by translating multiple civil codes from Spanish into
English. 13
12. For the relationship of American business expansion in Latin America
and Pan-American unification of law efforts, see Burton I. Kaufman, United
States Trade and Latin America: The Wilson Years, 58 J. AM. HIST. 342, 343,
358-61 (1971). For inter-American conferences discussing unification of U.S. and
Latin American law during early years of the 20th century, see Curtis Wilgus, The
Third International American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, 1906, 12 HISP. AM.
HIST. REV. 420, 424, 444-48 (1932) (discussing the unification of hemispheric
law efforts at 1906 conference) and John Bassett Moore, The Pan-American Financial Conferences and the Inter-American High Commission, 14 AM. J. INT’L
L. 343 (1920) (similar focus at Pan-American Financial Conference of 1915).
13. Early 20th century American legal scholars frequently commented about
the stimulation of interest in civil law systems occasioned by American acquisition of civil law jurisdictions in the Spanish-speaking world. See, e.g., WILLIAM
WIRT HOWE, STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LAW 10 (2d rev. ed., Cambridge U. Press
1905) (for Louisiana judge arguing: “We find ourselves confronted with new
problems. Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines contain some twelve millions of
people whom we control, more or less, and whose laws and jurisprudence we
must, to some extent, at least, understand.”); 1 CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN,
ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD § 310 (Boston Book Co. 1917) (for Yale
law professor stating: “For utilitarian reasons alone, ignoring all others, the American acquisition of Spain’s former colonies has given a tremendous impulse to the
study of Roman and Spanish law in American law schools.”).
For early 20th century scholarship on Spanish civil law, see the numerous articles in the new Comparative Law Bureau’s Annual Bulletin (1908-1914), including: Samuel P. Scott, Spanish Jurisprudence Comparatively Considered, 2 ANN.
BULL. 14 (1909); Samuel P. Scott, Spanish Criminal Law Compared with That
Branch of Anglo-Saxon Jurisprudence, 3 ANN. BULL. 62 (1910); Charles S.
Lobingier, A Decade of Juridical Fusion in the Philippines, 3 ANN. BULL. 38
(1911) [hereinafter, Lobingier, Juridical Fusion]; Charles S. Lobingier, The Spanish Law in the Philippines, 4 ANN. BULL. 32 (1911) [hereinafter, Lobingier, Spanish Law]. A “Spanish Craze” in comparative law spread also to the classroom,
where Yale, Columbia, and Michigan offered courses on Spanish law by 1910.
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Most of the Spanish-English civil code translations were a response either to War Department administrative needs in new territories or were part of the Bureau’s Foreign Code Series. Shortly after the initial occupation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the
United States promptly repealed Spanish-era penal codes and codes
of civil and criminal procedure, though local private law codes were,
to varying degrees, left intact. A similar process was followed in the
Canal Zone a few years later, except that the department of Panama
had not promulgated its own civil code during the brief interval between independence from Colombia in 1903 and American acquisition of the isthmus in 1904; thus, the United States adopted the Colombian Civil Code of 1887 rather than local Panamanian legislation. 14 In each possession, the official policy of retaining private law
while replacing public law, adopted previously in Louisiana and in
several British colonies, led to the creation of hybrid legal systems
administered by American colonial judges working alongside local
judges trained in Spanish civil law. During the period, the Spanish
language was not widely taught or known in the United States, and
competent translation of primary legal authority was therefore essential. 15
After the mixed systems were established, the locus of translation activity shifted to the Comparative Law Bureau, whose membership overlapped with scholars of international law as well as the
inter-American bar in New York. Economic expansion in South
See COLUM. U., PRESIDENT’S ANN. REP. 115-16 (1902) (listing Spanish civil law
courses); U. MICH. DEP’T OF L., ANN. ANNOUNCEMENT 1902-1903 27 (1902)
(same); YALE U., CATALOGUE 375 (1908) (same).
14. See, e.g., Rodríguez Ramos, supra note 11, at 21 (describing the repeal
of Puerto Rican penal code and codes of criminal and civil procedure, replacement
with common law codes between 1902-1903); Lobingier, Spanish Law, supra
note 13, at 39-40 (describing a similar process in Philippines between 1900-1902);
BRAY, supra note 11, at 76, 96 & n.6 (describing a similar process in Canal Zone
between 1905-1907).
15. See, e.g., J. Preston Hoskins, Statistical Survey of the Effect of the World
War on Modern Language Enrollment in the Secondary Schools of the United
States, 10 MOD. LANG. J. 87, 88 & tbl.1 (1925) (‘Comparative Table for the Whole
United States’) (survey showing less than 1% of American high school students
enrolled in Spanish language classes during pre-World War I period).
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America, as well as Pan-Americanism’s emphasis on uniform legislation, created heightened demand for American lawyers with specialized expertise in Latin American law, and the Bureau’s sponsorship of Spanish-English code translations was meant to facilitate
practical and scholarly access to the fundamental laws of the most
important trading partners in the region. 16
The first Spanish-language civil code to be translated was the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889. The Code had quickly been extended
by Spain to her colonies and remained in force at the time Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines came under American control in
1898. The following year, the military governor of Havana, MajorGeneral William Ludlow, ordered Walton, an American lawyer who
had studied at the University of Havana and was now serving in the
U.S. Volunteers, to translate the Code into English. 17 Walton’s
translation was completed in a matter of months, presumably in
Cuba. He was assisted by a Cuban-born lawyer and political exile,
Néstor Ponce de León, who had fled the Spanish colony for America
in 1870; better remembered today as a correspondent of the revolutionary José Martí, Ponce de León was also a literary figure and
sometime lexicographer in New York. 18

16. See, e.g., Andrew G. Peters, Importance of the Study of Latin-American
Law, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 208, 210 (1916) (Treasury official’s address to ABA
meeting advocating law school teaching of civil law systems as part of wider effort by legal profession to support American business expansion in Latin America); Phanor J. Eder, Pan-Americanism and the Bar, 43 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 340,
341 (characterizing the knowledge of civil law systems as “the first essential” if
American bar to play constructive role in Pan-American movement).
17. THE SPANISH CIVIL CODE IN FORCE IN SPAIN, CUBA, PUERTO RICO, AND
THE PHILIPPINES (Clifford S. Walton ed., Clifford S. Walton and Néstor Ponce de
León trans., La Propaganda literaria Printing House 1899) [hereinafter, Span. Civ.
C.].
18. See RAIMUNDO CABRERA, CUBA Y SUS JUECES 297-98, 318 (Compañía
Lévytype 1891). Ponce de León returned to Havana shortly after the SpanishAmerican War and was appointed director and custodian of the Cuban National
Archives. See [U.S. ARMY] HEADQUARTERS DIV. OF CUBA, CIVIL ORDERS AND
CIRCULARS 167 (1899) (appointment order).
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Over the next two years, the War Department translated dozens
of Spanish-era laws for use in the new possessions. 19 Among the
department’s principal translators was Francis Leon Joannini, the
son of an Italian minister to Mexico. Born in Italy, Joannini spent
part of his youth in Mexico and was presumably fluent in Spanish.20
As official translator for the Insular Affairs division, Joannini had
already translated several Filipino legal codes by the time the Canal
Zone approached him to translate the Colombian Civil Code. An
Argentine code translation for the Bureau was completed in 1913
(though not published for several years). At the time of his tragic
death in an automobile accident in 1917, Joannini was at work translating the Peruvian Civil Code and drafting an English dictionary of
Spanish legal terms. 21
Joannini’s last two civil code translations were part of the Bureau’s aforementioned efforts to translate foreign law into English. 22
Although the Bureau commissioned or agreed to publish only six
translations during its short existence, all but one (R.P. Shick’s
translation of the Swiss Civil Code) were Spanish or Latin American
codes. In the case of the Argentine and Peruvian Civil Codes, the
translations were entrusted to a revision committee chaired by
Phanor Eder, a Colombian-born lawyer based in New York. An enthusiastic proponent of Pan-Americanism, Eder was a major figure
among New York’s inter-American bar up until his retirement in the
1960s. 23 The last translation approved by the Bureau was Wheless’s

19. E.g., DIV. OF CUSTOMS & INSULAR AFF. [DCIA], TRANSLATION OF THE
NOTARIAL LAWS IN FORCE IN CUBA AND PUERTO RICO (1899); [DCIA],
TRANSLATION OF LAW OF PORTS IN FORCE IN THE ISLAND OF CUBA (1900).
20. See “P.J.E.”, Necrology: Frank Joannini, 3 A.B.A. J. 104-05 (1917) (obituary with biographical details).
21. See A Deplorable Loss to Pan-Americanism, 6 SO. AMER. 33 (1917) (additional biographical information).
22. See generally W.W. Smithers, Proceedings of the Comparative Law Bureau, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1001, 1004 (1907) (listing the Bureau’s initial objectives, including translation of foreign legislation into English).
23. See To Phanor James Eder, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 479 (1970) (issue dedication). As early as the 1920s, Eder and Wheless were among a small, recognized
group of New York lawyers representing American interests in Latin America.
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Brazilian Civil Code. Like Eder, Wheless was one of a handful of
New York-based lawyers with experience representing clients in
Latin America; prior to the Mexican Revolution, he had practiced
law in that country and had written several articles on the subject of
Mexican law. 24 Indeed, there was a significant overlap between the
Bureau’s translators, its Latin American editorial staff, and this
small, cosmopolitan group of expatriate and émigré lawyers. 25
A. Walton’s Spanish Civil Code Translation (1899): A Common Lawyer’s Approach
The military order instructing Walton to prepare a translation of
the Spanish Civil Code was dated March 21, 1899; he was honorably
discharged from the Army seven weeks later, on June 13. 26 If Walton completed his translation before he left military service, he must
have worked quickly. The assumption that the translation’s publication was expedited finds further support in the numerous typographical errors. 27 A first edition nevertheless appeared that same year as
The Spanish Civil Code, while a second edition, including a new
historical introduction to Spanish law, was published in 1900 under
the title The Civil Law in Spain and Spanish-America. 28 By the time
this second, expanded edition was published, Walton was pursuing

See ENRIQUE GIL, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF ARGENTINE AND
BRAZILIAN CIVIL LAW 3 (1921).
24. E.g., Joseph Wheless, A Lawsuit in Mexico, 22 GREEN BAG 612 (1910);
Joseph Wheless, The Mexican Notarial System, 5 ANN. BULL. 42 (1912).
25. See Organization and Work of the Bureau of Comparative Law, 1 A.B.A.
J. 591, 592 (1915) (listing the Bureau’s editorial staff members for 1915). Shick
was chairman, while Eder, Wheless, and Robert Kerr were editors for Latin America, Charles Lobingier for the Philippines, and Scott and Wheless for Spain.
Wheless and Scott both translated codes for the Bureau, while Eder, Wheless, and
Kerr served on multiple revision committees.
26. See Special Order No. 68 in Span. Civ. C. (preface) (March 21, 1899);
[U.S. ARMY] ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S OFF., OFFICIAL REGISTER OF OFFICERS OF
VOLUNTEERS 141 (1900) (listing discharge dated June 13, 1899).
27. See, for example, Span. Civ. C. 39-48, which alone contain seven misspellings.
28. CLIFFORD STEVENS WALTON, THE CIVIL LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISHAMERICA (1900).
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further studies (‘doctorando’) at the University of Madrid. 29 Unfortunately, while Walton supplemented this second edition with various citations to several other Latin American civil codes, there is no
evidence from the first edition suggesting which sources, if any, he
may have used in preparing the original translation.
Regardless of sources or legal training, Walton’s translation of
the Spanish Civil Code has a decidedly “common law” feel to it.
Throughout the translation, Walton rendered basic civil law concepts into legal English rather than transliterate Spanish civil law
concepts or use English civilian terminology. Thus, servidumbres,
mandato, and tutela are translated as ‘easements’, ‘agency’, and
‘guardianship’ rather than less-familiar civil law English terms such
as servitudes, mandate, and tutorship. 30 Likewise, tutela dativa is
rendered ‘guardianship by appointment’ rather than the more-civilian dative tutorship. 31
Nowhere is Walton’s method more apparent than in Book II
(property), where bienes muebles and bienes inmuebles have been
translated as ‘personal property’ and ‘real property’, respectively,
rather than movables and immovables. 32 Moreover, Walton introduced legal English’s many distinctions between realty and personalty into his translation, even though Spanish civil law’s lexicon
does not usually make such distinctions. Thus, civil law enajenación
is often rendered ‘conveyance’ in the context of immovables, yet
‘alienation’ or ‘sale’ when referring to movables. 33 Throughout his
29. Id. at tit.p.
30. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VII (servidumbres = easements); Bk. IV, tit.
IX (mandato = agency); Bk. I, tit. IX (tutela = guardianship).
31. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IX, ch. 4 (tutela dativa = guardianship
by appointment).
32. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I (bienes muebles, bienes inmuebles =
personal property, real property).
33. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, arts. 974-976 (enajenación = ‘conveyance’ in context of immovables); Bk. III, tit. III, art. 978; Bk. II, tit. VI, art.
494 (enajenación = ‘alienation’, ‘sale’ in context of movables). Compare Louisiana law: “In Louisiana, ‘Land is not ‘conveyed’ by deed but is sold…One sells
land by the same contract and in the same way – in terms of theory – as one sells
an automobile.” N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary,
54 LA. L. REV. 1265, 1289 (1993) (emphasis in original) (citing Patrick H. Martin
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translation, the long shadow of English property law (and its effect
on legal English) is apparent: plena propiedad is ‘fee simple’, 34 desahucio is ‘ejectment’, 35 and perturbación is ‘trespass’. 36
The Army lawyer was equally proactive in converting possessory actions and obligations into common law English. In Book II
(property), the Spanish action reivindicar is translated ‘recover’,
while in Book IV (obligations), causa is ‘consideration’ (not
cause), 37 obligaciones solidarias are ‘joint obligations’, 38 transacción is ‘compromise’, 39 and confusión is (usually) ‘merger’. 40 At
times, Walton’s gratuitous use of legal English serves little purpose
other than to clothe his translation in the familiar legal English of
Anglo-American law. Thus: ‘banns’ for proclamas, 41 ‘Act of God’
for siniestro, 42 ‘wear and tear’ for deterioros, 43 and ‘writ of seizure’
for mandamiento de embargo de bienes. 44 Throughout the translation, the common lawyer feels very much at home, though possibly
misled about the subtle differences in terminology.
The purpose in elaborating Walton’s translation preferences is
not to suggest that Walton was ignorant of the distinctions between

& J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and Texas Oil & Gas Law: An Overview of the
Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 787-88 (1992)).
34. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. II, art. 634 (plena propiedad = fee simple).
35. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. VII, art. 1656 (acción de desahucio = ejection).
36. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. VI, art. 1560 (perturbación = trespass).
37. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. II, art. 348 (reivindicar = recover); Bk. IV,
tit. II, arts. 1274-1277 (causa = consideration).
38. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, arts. 1136-1137 (obligaciones solidarias
= joint obligations).
39. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XIII, ch. 1 (transacción = compromise).
40. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, art. 1156 (confusión = ‘merger’ in
context of extinction of obligations); Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 546 (confusión = ‘merger’
in context of extinction of servitudes); but see Bk. IV, tit. I, arts. 1192-1194 (confusión = ‘confusion’ in context of extinction of obligations).
41. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IV, art. 44 (proclamas = (marriage)
banns).
42. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VI, art. 484 (siniestro = Act of God).
43. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. X, art. 1746 (deterioros = wear and tear).
44. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II, art. 1297 (mandamiento de embargo de
bienes = writ of seizure).
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the two legal traditions or of alternative civilian English vocabularies. Indeed, some of the civil law concepts in the Spanish Civil Code
were substantially equivalent to their common law counterparts, and
the use of legal English was not likely to lead to confusion of interpretation, although there was certainly this risk in several instances.
Moreover, Walton was perfectly capable of rendering Spanish civil
law concepts into English by transliteration or by using jurisdictionneutral English civil law terms. For example, donación is ‘donation’
(not, say, inter vivos gift), and vicios redhibitorios are ‘redhibitory
vices’, 45 while Walton hints at the important distinction between
cause and consideration when he places the Spanish concept in parentheses on the initial use of the word (i.e., ‘consideration
(causa)’), although admittedly without further elucidation. 46 In a
subsequent article for the Annual Bulletin, Walton even criticized
War Department translators of the Filipino mortgage law, alleging
confusion in their use of ‘property rights’ for derechos reales. 47
Nevertheless, Walton clearly preferred to use common law English terms for civil law concepts wherever possible. The risk of misleading American lawyers into assuming that the two systems were
broadly interchangeable was a risk Walton was willing to take, if he
considered it a risk at all. Why the translator believed that a legal
translation that de-emphasized legal difference was desirable is not
certain. That the original translation’s target audience was military
and civilian administrators is no doubt an important part of the explanation, for such men were usually trained in the common law, if
45. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. II (donación = donation); Bk. IV, tit. IV,
arts. 1491, 1499 (redhibición, vicios redhibitorios = redhibition, redhibitory
vices).
46. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II, art. 1274 (causa). The important distinction between cause and consideration has long been recognized. See, e.g.,
GUTTERIDGE, supra note 1, at 117 (“Comparative lawyers are only too familiar
with the kind of problem which lies concealed behind such words as causa and
consideration.”); see also GREGORY W. ROME & STEPHAN KINSELLA, LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW DICTIONARY 7 (Quid Pro Books 2011) (“Cause is not the same thing
as consideration.”).
47. See Clifford S. Walton, Interests of a Mortgagee in Real Property under
the Common and Civil Law, 5 ANN. BULL. 63, 66 (1912).
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they had any legal training at all. It is also probable that Walton
lacked access in Havana to English translations of civil law materials using civilian vocabularies, although these were certainly available in the United States. 48 Yet even in the second edition (intended
for a more academic readership), Walton made few changes, and he
continued to use common law English terms to describe subtly-different Spanish civil law concepts in a subsequent article for the
Comparative Law Bureau. 49
An equally likely explanation for Walton’s translation method
was common practice of the time, which was relatively tolerant of
translations of civil law materials into the legal English of the common law. 50 It is important to note that this practice was conventional
even among English and American civil law scholars and judges
who otherwise exhibited a serious interest in comprehending the nuances of civil law-common law difference. 51

48. See, for example, the popular American edition of Harris’s translation of
the Institutes using mandatary, dative tutor, compensation, and revendication:
THOMAS COOPER, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 61, 284, 347, 445 (2d ed. 1841).
49. Clifford S. Walton, The Spanish Law of Prescription, 2 ANN. BULL. 25,
26-28 (1909) (using the terms ‘adverse possession’, ‘tort’, and ‘real property’ for
various Spanish civil law concepts).
50. This observation was previously made by Joseph Dainow in his explanatory note to the 1940 compilation of the Louisiana civil codes (with cross-references to the Code Napoléon), in which he criticized both Wright’s (1908) and
Cachard’s (1895) English translations of the French civil code. See Explanatory
Notes, in COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA, LOUISIANA
LEGAL ARCHIVES vol. 3, at xiii, xviii (State of Louisiana 1940) (regretting that
French-English translations did not always use “the language of the civilian”)
(cited in Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code in French: Translation and
Retranslation, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 223, 245 & nn.42-43 (2016) (briefly discussing
problems of French civil law translations using legal English)). These problems
are similarly present in other contemporary civil code translations. See, e.g., THE
CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN (John Harington Gubbins trans., Maruya 1897) (translation
of Japanese Civil Code using predominantly common law vocabulary).
51. See, e.g., E. BLACKWOOD WRIGHT, THE CODE NAPOLEON; BEING THE
FRENCH CIVIL CODE passim (1908) (for British colonial judge comparing civil
law and common law doctrines throughout translation but nevertheless rendering
many French civil law terms into legal English). Wright was chief justice of the
Seychelles.
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B. Joannini’s Colombian Civil Code Translation (1905): A Civil
Law Alternative
By contrast, Joannini’s approach to his Colombian Civil Code
translation was radically different to Walton’s, and we know much
more about it. First, Joannini strove as much as possible to render
Colombian private law concepts into “civil law English” rather than
legal English. The desire to present civil law concepts in English
without losing the tradition’s distinctive categories and terminology
frequently meant turning to the civil law entries in Black’s Law Dictionary, or in Books II-IV, adopting the civilian vocabulary of Louisiana’s Civil Code. In an “Explanatory Note,” Joannini stated his
reasons for avoiding use of legal English for civil law concepts:
An effort has been made to secure as correct a translation as
possible, and in some cases the translator may be accused of
sacrificing what may be called good English for fidelity to
the original text. He has been constantly on guard against
making an interpretation of law instead of a translation. 52
Joannini’s policy of avoiding “making an interpretation of law”
included more than merely “sacrificing what may be called good
English.” It meant consistently reducing the use of technical legal
English in order to limit opportunities for confusion by Americans
trained exclusively in the common law tradition, as will be demonstrated in greater detail below.
Second, Joannini, unlike Walton, was more forthcoming about
the materials he used for his translation: in a “List of Works Consulted in Translating the Civil Code,” Joannini conveniently listed
his principal sources. 53 Among those which the translator consulted
were Angarita’s Código Civil Nacional (de Colombia) Concordado
(1888), two Spanish legal dictionaries (those of Alcubilla and
Escriche), and, most importantly, Black’s Law Dictionary and Merrick’s 1900 edition of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (which itself

52. See Explanatory Note in Col. Civ. C. at 10.
53. See id. at 9 for List of Works Consulted.
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includes cross-references to corresponding articles in the Code Napoléon). 54 The “List of Works Consulted” was not exhaustive, however. Elsewhere in the translation, Joannini cited articles in the Chilean Civil Code,55 Howe’s first edition of Studies in the Civil Law,56
and Mackeldy’s Handbook of Roman Law. 57 Moreover, he referred
on at least one occasion to various unnamed Spanish and French
laws “to which the translator has had access,” while in a discussion
of Book IV, title VII, Joannini indicated that he had consulted the
Spanish, French, Italian, Mexican, and Dutch Civil Codes in an effort to better understand the title’s subject matter. 58 In retrospect, his
translation was a serious effort at legal comparison.
The result of Joannini’s different approach, including his reliance on Black’s and the Louisiana Civil Code, was a thoroughly civilian-feeling translation of Colombian private law. Where Walton
had used ‘guardianship’ for civil law tutela, Joannini instead used
tutorship (as well as related terms such as dative tutor, curator,
etc.). 59 Where Walton chose ‘easements’, Joannini chose servitudes. 60 Where Walton preferred ‘agent’, Joannini preferred mandatary. 61 Cargas are never ‘liens’. ‘Writs’, ‘trespass’, and ‘ejectment’
54. Id. (citing various sources, including MARCELO MARTÍNEZ ALCUBILLA,
DICCIONARIO DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN ESPAÑOLA (1892-1902), JOAQUÍN
ESCRICHE, DICCIONARIO RAZONADO DE LEGISLACIÓN Y JURISPRUDENCIA (1888),
REVISED CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA (Edwin T. Merrick ed., F. F. Hansell & Bro.,
Limited 1900) [hereinafter, La. Civ. C. (1870)], and HENRY C. BLACK, A
DICTIONARY OF LAW (1891) [hereinafter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY]); see also
John H. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 280, 296 (1931)
(discussing Merrick’s 1900 edition).
55. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. at 71 & n.†, 86 & n.* (citing to Chilean Civil Code
arts. 208 & 266).
56. Id. at 153 & n.* (citing WILLIAM WIRT HOWE, STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LAW
79-80 (1896), for a discussion of civil law concept of real rights).
57. Id. at 164 & n.* (citing F. MACKELDY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW
§ 271 (T. & J. W. Johnson 1883), defining “specification”).
58. See id. at 219 & fn.† (regarding assignments); id. at 326 & n.* (regarding
facultative obligations).
59. Compare Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IV, art. 50 (tutor = guardian), with Col.
Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXII (tutor, tutela = tutor, tutorship) and Bk. I, tit. XXII, ch. 4
(tutor dativa = dative tutor); see also Kinsella, supra note 33, at 1293.
60. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XI (servidumbres = servitudes).
61. Compare Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX (mandato = agency), with Col. Civ.
C. Bk. IV, tit. XXVIII (mandato, mandatario = mandate, mandatary).

122

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 11

are entirely lacking. Reivindicación is revendication (not mere ‘recovery’). 62
Based on even a cursory review, several important conclusions
can be drawn from Joannini’s translation choices. First, Joannini
preferred transliteration of Spanish-language civil law terms, in
some circumstances even where the potential for confusion with legal or colloquial English was significant: thus, compensación is usually rendered compensation, not ‘set-off’; transacción is transaction, not ‘compromise’; and confusión is confusion, not ‘merger’. 63
Second, Joannini avoided legal English property terminology
with its different distinctions between real estate and chattels, as this
might have implied an exaggerated equivalence with distinctive civilian property law categories. Thus, in Joannini’s translation,
bienes muebles are, correctly, movables and bienes inmuebles, immovables; only bienes raíces are real property. 64 Absent is Walton’s
invented distinction between sale of movables and conveyance of
immovables: enajenación is usually translated alienation or sale, regardless of context. 65
Third, in Joannini’s search for an English articulation of civil
law concepts, he frequently relied on the distinctive legal English of
Louisiana’s civil law tradition, in particular the special civil law
English terminology of the Louisiana Civil Code. Thus, gananciales

62. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XII (reivindicación = revendication).
63. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XIV, art. 1625 (compensación, transacción, confusión = compensation, transaction, confusion). Cf. Levasseur & Trahan,
infra note 178, at 118, 127 (for English translators of Cornu’s Vocabulaire Juridique warning against translating compensation and confusion as common law setoff and merger).
64. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I, ch. 1, 2 (bienes muebles, bienes inmuebles,
bienes raíces = movables, immovables, real property); see also Bk. III, tit. XIII,
art. 1457 (for rare use of ‘realty’).
65. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXX, art. 576 (for alienation of movables); Bk. I, tit. XIX, art. 345 (for alienation of immovables); but see Col. Civ. C.
Bk. I, tit. IX, art. 182 (for rare use of ‘convey’ for Spanish verb enajenar).
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are acquets and gains, 66 desheredación is disinherison, 67 obligaciones solidarias are solidary obligations, 68 and prestaciones
mutuas are mutual prestations. 69 Both lesión grave and lesión
enorme are translated lesion beyond moiety, 70 and beneficio de escusión appears as benefit of discussion. 71 The first and last examples
are both instances where Joannini departed from his usual preference for transliteration in order to follow the Louisiana Code’s
unique vocabulary.
Indeed, even in cases where Joannini had a choice between using
a particular English civil law or Scots law term (which are plentiful
in the first edition of Black’s), the translator frequently preferred the
Louisiana term instead. Thus, curador de bienes is translated as curator ad bona rather than curator bonis. 72 Elsewhere, título vicioso
is vicious title (as opposed to Walton’s more common law-sounding

66. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXII, ch. 5 (gananciales = acquets and
gains). “Community of acquets and gains. The community property matrimonial
regime of Louisiana under which spouses are co-owners of certain property that
either spouse acquires during the marriage.” ROME & KINSELLA, supra note 46,
at 9 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2327, 2338-2340 (2011)); see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 28 (10th ed., Bryan A. Garner ed. 2014) (identifying acquets
and gains as a Louisiana law term); cf. JOAQUÍN ESCRICHE, ELEMENTS OF THE
SPANISH LAW 37-38 (Bethel Coopwood trans. 1886) (Texas lawyer using the term
ganancial property instead).
67. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. V, ch. 4 (desheredación = disinherison).
68. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX (obligaciones solidarias = solidary obligations). For a recent discussion of the problem of translating solidary obligations
as joint and several, see Moréteau, supra note 1, at 706, 709.
69. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XII, ch. 4 (prestaciones mutuas = mutual
prestations). The English ‘prestation’ survives also in Puerto Rican legal English.
See, e.g., 31 LPRA § 3048 (‘mutual prestations’).
70. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXIII, ch. 13 (lesión enorme = lesion beyond
moiety); Bk. III, tit. VII, art. 1291 (lesión grave = same).
71. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXXV, arts. 2383-84 (beneficio de excusión
= benefit of discussion). Plea of discussion has since been abolished in Louisiana,
but Joannini’s translation cites the earlier code articles that were then in effect.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3045 cmt. (a) (2017) (“This Article … abolishes the
pleas of division and discussion formerly recognized in C.C. Arts. 3045-3051
(1870).”).
72. Compare Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXX (curador de bienes = curator ad
bona), with LA. CODE PRACTICE art. 958 (curator ad bona); see also Welsh v.
Baxter, 45 La. Ann. 1062, 1064 (1893) (discussing 1830 abolition of curators ad
bona in Louisiana). See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 309;
Black’s lists only the Scots law ‘curator bonis’.
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‘flawed title’), 73 and discernimiento (for appointment of dative tutors) is confirmation. 74 Similarly, Joannini’s preference for translating tenencia as seizin rather than tenancy (particularly in Book III
(successions)) appears to imitate Louisiana legal English’s use of
the former term in its own law of successions. 75
Despite an obvious preference for civil law terminology, Joannini did not entirely avoid technical legal English. There are occasional references in his Colombian Civil Code translation to cestui
que trustent, 76 flotsam and jetsam, 77 and other common law terms.
Both dolo and fraude have been (perhaps confusingly) rendered
fraud, and Joannini occasionally used common law terms for unrelated Colombian civil law concepts. 78 For the most part, however,
Joannini confined legal English terms such as ‘agency’, ‘bailments’,
and ‘easements’ to the translation’s index, where readers are directed to search instead for mandate, loans for use and consumption,
and servitudes. 79 The result is a civil code translation well on its way
to being purged of English property and contract law terminology.
Joannini’s translation raises the interesting question: Why did he
rely so heavily on the Louisiana Civil Code for articulating the civil
law in English? There are at least two plausible explanations. First,
Joannini may have been told to do so by the Isthmian Canal Commission. Such a possibility is raised by parallel developments in
Puerto Rico, where the local revision commission of two Americans
and one Puerto Rican had recently incorporated language from the
73. Compare Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXII, art. 1792 (título vicioso), with
La. Civ. C. art. 3452 (1870) (“vicious and defective title”).
74. Compare Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXIII, art. 463 (discernimiento = confirmation), with La. Civ. C. art. 260 (1870) (judicial “confirmation” of tutors).
75. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. VII, art. 1297 (tenencia = seizin); cf. La.
Civ. C. arts. 940-949 (1870) (for seizin of heirs in Louisiana law of successions).
76. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VIII, art. 807 (fideicomisario = cestui
que trustent).
77. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. IV, art. 710 (especies náufragas = flotsam and
jetsam).
78. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. IX, art. 846; Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 768 (dolo,
fraude); Bk. III, tit. V, art. 1245 (cuarta de mejoras = quarter betterments); cf. LA.
C.C. ANN. art. 1231 (2017) (discussing “advantages” and “extra portions”).
79. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. at 599, 602, 622 (index terms).
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Louisiana Code into Book I of the island’s Spanish-era Civil Code. 80
By making Canal Zone law look and sound more like Louisiana law,
the Canal Zone government may have hoped that American colonial
judges on the Isthmus, though unfamiliar with the civil law tradition
generally, might nevertheless be able to interpret the local civil code
using Louisiana jurisprudence. There is only scattered evidence
from the Canal Zone’s law reports (1905-1926) of local judges actually applying Louisiana law in this way (assuming they even had
access to Louisiana decisions), and, in any event, the Canal Zone’s
mixed legal system did not survive the 1930s. 81 Nonetheless, it is
possible that Joannini’s many cross-references to Louisiana Code
articles and use of the state’s legal English were meant to facilitate
comparative use of Louisiana jurisprudence by American judges in
Panama.
A chief problem with this explanation, however, is scattered evidence that Joannini began his translation work without the Louisiana Civil Code. First, there are no cross-references to Louisiana
Code articles in Book I (persons), although these are frequent elsewhere in the translation. 82 Second, the use of distinctive Louisiana
civil law terms such as disinherison, lesion beyond moiety, and benefit of discussion, is irregular and relatively infrequent until Book II
(property), and is most pronounced in Books III and IV (successions, obligations). Third, although, as a rule, Joannini preferred civilian terminology to legal English, there are several instances in
80. 1 LUIS MUÑOZ MORALES, RESEÑA HISTÓRICA Y ANOTACIONES AL
CÓDIGO CIVIL DE PUERTO RICO 22-44 (Junta Editora de la Universidad de Puerto
Rico 1947) (discussing the work of the 1901-1902 revision commission including
adoption of articles from Louisiana code).
81. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Panama R.R. Co., 2 C.Z. Rep. 111 (C.Z. 1913)
(for a rare example of Canal Zone court applying Louisiana jurisprudence to question of Colombian private law); see also Collins, supra note 7, at 233 (describing
the Colombian Code’s repeal in 1933 and replacement by a new code based on
California law). The adoption of a common-law code greatly reduced the potential
influence of Louisiana jurisprudence in the Zone’s future legal development.
82. See, for example, Joannini’s citations to La. Civ. C. arts. 533 et seq.
(1870) for parallel references to Louisiana law of usufruct, Col. Civ. C. at 182;
La. Civ. C. arts. 2520 et seq. (1870) for revendication, Col. Civ. C. at 397; La.
Civ. C. arts. 3176 et seq. (1870) for antichresis, Col. Civ. C. at 495; etc.
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Book I where the translator initially used a common law term, such
as ‘convey’ or ‘set-off’, only to abandon it by the middle of Book II,
possibly suggesting a change of approach early on in the translation
process. 83 In further support of this conclusion, Joannini’s inconsistent alternation between translating fianza and caución as bond,
surety, and suretyship appears to stabilize only in Book IV, or
around the time that the translator would have compared the Colombian articles to the Louisiana Civil Code’s articles 3035 et seq. on
suretyship.
A second explanation, therefore, seems more likely: Joannini decided to consult the Louisiana Civil Code only after encountering
numerous citations to its articles in the civil law entries in Black’s
Law Dictionary. 84 The fact that Alcubilla’s 1892 Diccionario (like
many legal encyclopedias and dictionaries in the civil law tradition)
cites to code articles for definitions of Spanish civil law terms may
have reinforced in Joannini’s mind the utility of consulting an English-language civil code for his own translation work. By doing so,
Joannini’s translation became truly comparative, as he checked his
own definitions and civil law English vocabulary against that of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
That Joannini was satisfied with the approach is evident from
the fact that he continued to employ Louisiana’s civilian terminology in his subsequent translation of the Argentine Civil Code.

83. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IX, art. 182 (enajenar = convey); Bk. I,
art. 207 (simple mandatario = simple agent); Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 818 (compensar
= set off [n.]). By Bk. III, Joannini has abandoned convey, while in Bk. III, tit.
XXVIII, he uses mandatary, and in Bk. IV, tit. XVII, he uses compensation.
84. See, e.g., entries for ‘curator’, ‘immovable’, ‘servitudes’ in BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 309, 593, 1085 (citing Louisiana Civil Code articles for civil law terms appearing in Books I and II).
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Table 1. Spanish Civil Law Terms: Translation Choices in Walton
and Joannini

Spanish Civil
Law Term
gananciales 85
enajenación
(of immovables) 86
enajenación
(of movables) 87
desheredación 88
tutela dativa 89
bienes muebles,
bienes inmuebles 90
reivindicar [v.] 91
plena propiedad 92
dolo [n.] 93
servidumbres 94
obligaciones
solidarias 95
confusión 96

Walton’s
Translations

Joannini’s
Translations

profits of the conjugal
society (gananciales)
conveyance

acquets and gains*

alienation

alienation

disinheritance
guardianship by
appointment
personal property, real
property
recover [v.]
fee simple
deceit (dolo) or fraud
easements
joint obligations

disinherison*
dative tutorship*

merger

confusion

alienation or sale [n.]

movables, immovables
revendicate [v.]
full ownership
dolus
servitudes
solidary obligations*

85. Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IV, art. 72; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXII, ch. 5.
86. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, arts. 974-976; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXIII,
art. 1887 (alienation of immovables).
87. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, art. 978; Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXX, art.
576 (alienation of movables).
88. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, arts. 848-857; Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. V,
arts. 1258-1259.
89. Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IX, ch. 4; Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXII, ch. 4.
90. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I.
91. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. II, art. 348; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XII.
92. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. III, art. 399; Arg. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. X, art. 2909.
93. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. V, art. 457; Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, art. 1102;
Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § II, tit. I, ch. 2.
94. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VII; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XI.
95. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, art. 1136; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX.
96. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 546; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XI, art. 942
(both in context of servitudes).
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causa 97

consideration

perturbación 98
mandato, mandatario 99
beneficio de escusión 100
herederos forzosos 101

trespass [n.]
agency, agent

‘consideration
(causa)’ on initial use;
cause thereafter
disturbance [n.]
mandate, mandatary

benefit of a levy

benefit of discussion*

forced heirs*

forced heirs*

*terms presumably adopted from Louisiana Civil Code articles

C. Joannini’s Argentine Civil Code Translation (1917): More Civilian Yet?
If anything, Joannini’s 1917 translation of the Argentine Civil
Code was more “civilian” in feeling than his Colombian Civil Code
translation. First, he continued to prefer distinctive Louisiana civil
law terms such as acquets and gains, 102 disinherison, 103 solidary obligations, 104 and benefit of discussion. 105 The fact that standard editions of the Argentine Code include the drafter Dalmacio Vélez
Sarsfield’s notes, with their occasional references to the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code, may have influenced Joannini in this respect. 106

97. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II.
98. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. VI, art. 1560; Arg. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III.
99. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXVIII.
100. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XIV, arts. 1834-1837; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit.
XXXV, arts. 2383-2384.
101. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, art. 807; Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. V (for forced
heirs). Also known (in the Philippines) as compulsory heirs.
102. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § III, tit. II, art. 1271 (gananciales = acquets and
gains). (Joannini relied on the 1906 LaJouane edition for his translation, which
had erroneously re-numbered articles to take into account new legislation and
placed the code’s original article numbers in [brackets]. Only the earlier (correct)
numeration is used here).
103. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. IV, § I, tit. XVI (desheredación = disinherison).
104. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § I, tit. XIV (obligaciones solidarias = solidary
obligations).
105. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § III, tit. X, art. 2019 (beneficio de escusión =
benefit of discussion).
106. See Tucker, supra note 54, at 295: the Civil Code of 1870 was itself a
revision of the Civil Code of 1825, which was promulgated in French, translated
into English. See also Tucker, supra note 54, at 290-92, it later had its own im-
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Second, Joannini clarified certain civil law terms that he had used
inconsistently in his Canal Zone translation: he abandoned ‘fraud’
for dolo in favor of the Latin dolus, then placed fraude in parentheses to suggest a possible distinction between English fraud and the
Argentine civil law concept (i.e., ‘fraud (fraude)’). 107 Third, he
purged various common law terms which had survived in his earlier
project, including liens, consideration, betterments, breach (of contract), and wear and tear.
Even where Joannini preserved common law categorical distinctions, he was careful to clarify civilian usage. In the matter of successions, Joannini (rather unusually) distinguished between common law realty and personalty when he rendered cosas legadas as
‘things bequeathed’ (when movable) and ‘things devised’ (when immovable). 108 Nevertheless, Joannini provided a footnote explaining
that in the Spanish-language original the one term legar encompasses both concepts, and that the distinction in legal English is not
present in Spanish civil law. 109 Elsewhere, he re-purposed devise
and bequeath to instead distinguish between civil law concepts; in
Book III, he used the former to refer to a transfer of naked or full
ownership and the latter to refer to a transfer of rights merely of
enjoyment of a thing or usufruct. 110
portant, indirect influence on Vélez Sarsfield’s Argentine Civil Code via Florencio García Goyena’s Concordancias of 1852. See Agustín Parise, The Place of
the Louisiana Civil Code in the Hispanic Civil Codifications: The Comments to
the Spanish Civil Code Project of 1851, 68 LA. L. REV. 823, 848-52 (2008) [hereinafter Parise, Hispanic Codifications]; see also Olivier Moréteau & Agustín
Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103,
1116 (2009).
107. See, e.g., Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § II, tit. I, ch. 2 (dolo = dolus); Bk. II, § II,
tit. I, art. 954 (fraude = fraud).
108. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. IV, § I, tit. XVII (cosas legadas = things bequeathed,
things devised).
109. Arg. Civ. C. at 570 & n.20 (“This term [legado] includes both bequests
and devises. Legatario, which has been translated legatee, includes both legatees
and devisees. Devisee has, however, been used when a devise only and not also a
bequest is involved. The verb legar has been translated by the words bequeath
and devise, according to the class of property referred to.”).
110. See, e.g., Arg. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. X, arts. 2815-2816 (using ‘devise’ for
legado in context of naked ownership, ‘bequeath’ for legado in context of usufruct).
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In addition to purifying the civilian vocabulary in this second
translation, Joannini also supplemented the text with numerous footnotes that offered a comparative perspective on civilian terminology. Thus, on the first use of servitude, Joannini explained that
“[t]his term is used in lieu of the common law term easement not
only because the latter is not the exact equivalent of servitude, but
in order to be consistent in the use of civil law terms throughout this
translation.” 111 Similarly, on the first use of compensation, Joannini
clarified that, “[c]ompensation resembles in many respects the common law set-off. The principal difference is that a set-off must be
pled to be effectual; whereas compensation is effectual, without any
such plea.” 112 Even where Joannini concluded that the civil law and
common law terms represented more or less identical concepts, he
was careful to note the difference in terminology and persisted in
using the civil law term instead of a more-accessible common law
alternative. For example, in discussing transaction, Joannini conceded that “[t]his term is the equivalent of the common-law compromise” yet reaffirmed his decision to use the civilian rather than
legal English term, explaining that, “[a]s stated in the introductory
note, civil law terms have been strictly adhered to in this translation.” 113 Joannini then noted that ‘compromise’ means something
“very different” in the civil law, and defined that term as well, rather
than abandon the use of two civil law terms by substituting the morefamiliar ‘compromise’ and ‘settlement’. 114 Similar footnotes clarified civil law concepts such as cause, 115 charges, 116 cautions,117 and
so on, usually with citations to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary or Howe’s
Studies in the Civil Law.118

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. at 7 & n.2.
See id. at 118 & n.11.
Id. at 118 & n.12.
Id. at 118 & n.12.
Id. at 87 & n.1.
Id. at 96 & n.7.
Id. at 250 & n.42.
See, e.g., id. at 87 & n.1, 97 & n.8.
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In a “Translator’s Note,” Joannini was explicit about his objectives as a translator, which had not changed significantly from his
Colombian Civil Code translation a decade earlier:
In the following translation . . . the translator has used civil
law terms exclusively. Any attempt to employ common law
terms would have led to confusion and obscurity, but the index has been so prepared to afford the common law lawyer
enlightening facil’ty [sic] in consulting the work, and a number of footnotes have been inserted throughout giving authorized definitions of words not defined in the text itself.119
Joannini’s preference for banishing common law English terms
such as bailments, chattels, and replevin to his index (itself over 100
pages), and explaining differences in legal concepts in footnotes,
may be considered a significant departure from Walton’s method.120
For Walton, the comparative work of the translator occurs within the
text; for Joannini, comparison appropriately belongs outside the text
or in the postliminary materials. It is an approach that is often followed today, but which was by no means universal at the time.
D. Wheless’s Brazilian Civil Code Translation (1920): A Modified
Civilian Approach
The Comparative Law Bureau’s final translation prior to its demise was Wheless’s Brazilian Civil Code of 1920. In large part,
Wheless followed Joannini’s method, although not nearly to the
same extent. The former’s approach is best described as an attempt
to give the translation a civilian feel, while suggesting possible avenues of comparison for the English-speaking lawyer with no
knowledge of Portuguese or limited background in the civil law.
Thus, Wheless, unlike Joannini, avoided many unusual civilian
terms that would not be familiar to common law practitioners: he
prefers ‘recover’ for reivindicar, 121 ‘guardian’ for tutor, 122 and
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at xix.
See, e.g., id. at 638, 642, 709 (index terms).
Braz. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. 2, art. 248 (reivindicar = recover).
Braz. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. 7, ch. 1 (tutela = guardian).
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‘merger’ for confusão. 123 Distinctive Louisiana legal English terms,
for the most part, have been omitted: there are no acquets and gains
or disinherison, 124 although obrigações solidarias has been rendered solidary obligations. 125 On the other hand, Wheless regularly
employed civil law English terms for Brazilian property and contract law concepts: he uses servitudes for servidões, movables and
immovables for bens moveis and immoveis, redhibitory vices for vicios redhibitorios, dation in payment for dação em pagamento. 126
Elsewhere, Wheless rendered Portuguese-language civil law concepts into jurisdiction-neutral civilian English but placed an analogous common law English term in parentheticals for clarification.
Thus: ‘compensation (set-off)’ for compensação, ‘mandate (powers
of attorney)’ for mandato, ‘deposit (bailment)’ for deposito. 127 In
many cases, Wheless simply left the original Portuguese-language
civil law term in parentheses. The result is a translation that presents
basic civilian concepts in civilian legal English where possible yet
does not rely on jurisdiction-specific civil law terms from Louisiana’s Civil Code.

123. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. 3, art. 804 (confusão = merger).
124. Cf. Braz. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. 3, ch. 15 (desherdação = disinheritance).
125. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. 1, ch. 6 (obrigações solidarias = solidary obligations).
126. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. 3, art. 674 (servidões = servitudes), Bk.
II (parte geral), tit. 1, ch.1 (bens immoveis, bens moveis = immovables, movables);
Bk. III, tit. 4, ch. 5 (vicios redhibitorios = redhibitory vices); Bk. III, tit. 2, ch. 6
(dação em pagamento = dation in payment). This last term is near to Louisiana’s
‘giving in payment’ or ‘dation in paiement’. Cf. La. Civ. C. arts. 2655-2659 (1870)
(giving in payment); see also Taylor v. Taylor, 24 So. 2d 74, 75 (La. 1945)
(likening Louisiana law’s giving in payment to common-law ‘accord and satisfaction’).
127. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. 2, ch. 7 (compensação = compensation
(set-off)); Bk. III, tit. 5, ch. 7 (mandato = mandate (powers of attorney)), Bk. III,
tit. 5, ch. 6 (deposito = deposit (bailment)).
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III. CRITICAL RESPONSES TO JOANNINI AND WHELESS: BOOK
REVIEWS FROM LEGAL SCHOLARS
Initially, civil law scholars took negligible interest in the War
Department translations. There was little comment, for example, on
Walton’s Spanish Civil Code translation or its methods, with one
notable exception. 128 Even less was said of Joannini’s Colombian
Civil Code translation when it appeared a few years later, although
the work was briefly mentioned by both the Harvard Law Review
and Green Bag. 129 Only Phanor Eder appears to have expressed an
appreciation of the utility of a Spanish-English code translation that
preferred civil law terms to legal English. In the preface to his 1910
translation of Colombia’s mining laws, Eder stated cryptically that:
[He was] somewhat indebted to the translations of the Civil
Code [of Colombia] . . . by Frank L. Joannini . . . for the
occasional rendering of a knotty word or phrase whose near
equivalent (exactness is so often impossible so widely do the
English and the Spanish systems of law differ) involved
much groping . . . . 130
When the Bureau turned to publishing its own civil code translations, however, interest from legal scholars was much greater. Reviews in leading law journals alternated between effusive praise and
strong criticism of Joannini’s and Wheless’s use of civilian terminology. At first, the reviews were largely positive, particularly for
Joannini’s Argentine Civil Code translation. For example, in an
128. The one exception was Joseph Henry Beale, Jr., whose otherwise positive
review in the Harvard Law Review complained that Walton’s translation was “not
always commendable; hispanicisms remain to obscure the sense, and per contra
certain terms of our own law are misapplied to unlike Spanish ideas.” Joseph
Henry Beale, Jr., The Civil Law in Spain and Spanish America, 14 HARV. L. REV.
160 (1900) (book review).
129. The Civil Code of the Republic of Panama, 19 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1905)
(book review); The Civil Code of the Republic of Panama and Amendatory Laws,
17 GREEN BAG 556, 556 (1905) (book review) (stating that the translation is “said
to be the first civil code of a Latin-American country to be translated into English.”). In fact, Joannini missed this distinction by at least a year. Cf. THE CIVIL
CODE OF THE MEXICAN FEDERAL DISTRICT AND TERRITORIES (J.P. Taylor trans.,
American Book & Printing Co. 1904).
130. PHANOR JAMES EDER, THE MINING LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
COLOMBIA 3 (Press of B.S. Adams 1912).
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April, 1917 review in the ABA Journal, New York attorney and politician F.D. Pavey praised Joannini for exhibiting the necessary sensitivity to civil law-common law distinctions in vocabulary:
One of the distinguishing features of the work is the manner
in which the use of the civil law terms and common law
terms has been co-ordinated. The translator, with excellent
judgment, has used literal translations of civil law terms in
the text of the translation. The corresponding ideas in AngloSaxon jurisprudence are usually expressed by terms of the
common law which were either taken from other sources or
were so altered in the course of their transit through the early
stages of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that they bear no resemblance to the civil law terms. 131
Likewise, in the same issue, former law librarian of Congress
and Yale law professor Edwin Borchard stated that:
No one who has had experience in rendering into English the
legal concepts embraced in the system of a civil law country
can fail to appreciate the difficulty of the translator’s task,
nor be unduly captious in the criticism of terminology. The
work under review incorporates civil law terms in literal
translation, such as ‘prestation,’ ‘mandatory,’ [sic] ‘rehibitory vices,’ [sic] ‘tutorship,’ ‘benefit of inventory,’ ‘fisc,’
‘usufruct,’ ‘paternal power,’ ‘revendication,’ ‘transaction,’
and numerous others. Sometimes the expression is explained
in a footnote, at other times the Anglo-American lawyer will
be compelled to bring to the subject some prior orientation.
This method, however, whatever its weakness, is preferable
to any attempt at a free translation, with its efforts, inevitably
misleading and inaccurate, to employ a complete commonlaw terminology. 132
In early 1918, however, negative reviews began to appear. Several comparatists criticized Joannini’s civilian vocabulary, arguing
that the translation method was a weakness, not a strength. Layton
Register, who had studied law in Madrid and wrote several articles
on French law from a comparative perspective, was the first to raise
131. Frank D. Pavey, The Argentine Civil Code, 3 A.B.A. J. 702, 704 (1917)
(book review).
132. Edwin M. Borchard, The Argentine Civil Code, 3 A.B.A. J. 707, 707
(1917) (book review).
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an objection. Register wrote in the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review that Joannini’s avoidance of legal English’s technical terms
was unnecessary, even counterproductive:
He [the translator] decided to avoid a search for English
equivalents and to take over bodily the terminology of modern Roman law. Against this method of itself we make no
criticism beyond the inartistic invention of taking over of
such words as ‘mandate,’ ‘benefit of inventory,’ ‘prestation,’
‘discussion,’ ‘dative,’ ‘dolous,’ ‘resolutory conditions,’ ‘solidary obligations,’ ‘onerous contract of life annuity,’ (there
is almost humor in this), ‘disinherison,’ ‘caution juratory,’
and many other terms that might be enumerated . . . . Moreover we do not at all admit that it is necessary to invent a
terminology for words of Roman origin used to describe legal institutions having a broad equivalent in the common law
system. Any work on general jurisprudence would have enlightened the translator on the universalities of such categories as ‘agency,’ ‘bailment,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘lien,’ ‘defect.’ There
[sic] need not be rendered by ‘mandate,’ ‘commodatum,’
‘offense,’ ‘privilege,’ ‘vice’ . . . . 133
Two months later, Joseph Drake, who taught both Roman and
Spanish civil law at Michigan, came to the translation’s defense. In
what was a generally positive assessment in the Michigan Law Review, Drake stated that “[t]he translator, who has already proved his
capacity in several translations for the Bureau of Insular Affairs, has
wisely transliterated civil law terms instead of attempting to find
common translations for them . . . .”134 The reviewer also praised
Joannini for placing every-day common law terms in a copious index “for those unacquainted with civil law phraseology.” 135
A final review, however, was the most negative by far: the author criticized Joannini’s use of exceptions and civil fruits instead of
allegedly “equivalent terms” from the common law such as defenses

133. Register, supra note 8, at 182.
134. Joseph H. Drake, The Argentine Civil Code, 16 MICH. L. REV. 460, 469
(1918) (book review).
135. Id.
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and income and questioned the choice of compensation for compensación (rather than set-off) and transaction for transacción. 136 Of
the last two examples, the reviewer stated that there was “no excuse”
for “literal translations which result in evident confusion with English words, colloquial or technical, of different meaning.” 137
Reviews of Wheless’s Brazilian Civil Code translation a few
years later were even more negative. Ernest Lorenzen, whose research and teaching straddled both comparative law and conflicts of
law, panned Wheless not for the quality of his translation, which he
acknowledged “to be fairly accurate,” but rather for his adherence
to civilian terminology. 138 In echoes of Register from a few years
before, Lorenzen wrote in the Yale Law Journal that:
A good translation requires furthermore that the original text
should be reduced into idiomatic English. In the case of a
legal work this means that so far as possible the translation
should be expressed in the legal terminology familiar to English and American lawyers. In this respect the translation is
subject to criticism. In large number of instances where it
would have been perfectly easy to give the English [i.e.,
common law] equivalent the Portuguese words have been
simply anglicized. 139
In particular, Lorenzen criticized Wheless’s use of tradition instead of ‘delivery’ (for tradição), dation in payment instead of ‘giving in payment’ (for dação em pagamento), transaction instead of
‘compromise’ (for transação), and compromise instead of ‘arbitration’ (for compromisso), etc. 140
The most revealing of all the reviews, however, must be Max
Radin’s critique of Wheless’s translation in the California Law Review. According to Radin,

136. F.S. Philbrick, The Argentine Civil Code Together with the Constitution
and Law of Civil Registry, 13 ILL. L. REV. 64, 67-69 (1918) (book review).
137. Id. at 69.
138. Lorenzen, supra note 8, at 652.
139. Id. at 652-53.
140. Id. at 653.
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In all translation it is difficult to keep one’s linguistic balance, and the most careful writer finds himself lured into literal renderings that are quite unidiomatic in English. In law
the difficulty is increased by the fact that we have to translate
a fixed and technical terminology of one system of law into
the fixed and technical terminology of a wholly different
one. Most of the terms, even when superficially alike, have
wholly different implications. 141
In other words, Radin recognized the difference between the two
legal systems in question but cautioned against transliterations that
led to confusion with legal English. From Radin’s point of view, the
job of the translator was principally to overcome the inconveniences
of difference by rendering civil law concepts into the common law’s
“fixed and technical terminology.” If there were too much risk of
confusion, Radin argued for leaving such terms in the original language, which he criticized Wheless for doing too sparingly. 142
IV. COMPETING COMPARATIST PARADIGMS OF CIVIL LAWCOMMON LAW DIFFERENCE
Criticism of Joannini’s approach to legal translation might suggest, at first, a lack of sophistication about civilian terminology on
the part of the more-negative reviewers, or at least minimal awareness that use of legal English for distinct civil law concepts could
obscure the nuances of civil law-common law difference. Yet such
conclusions must be rejected, for Register, Lorenzen, and Radin
were all scholars of civilian systems, and their writings reveal that
they were well-acquainted with some of the critical differences between the two traditions. 143 Instead, their indifference to preserving

141. Radin, supra note 8, at 444.
142. Id. at 443.
143. Register studied modern civil law in Paris and Madrid before the First
World War and wrote mostly about comparative and international law topics. See,
e.g., Layton B. Register, A Morning at the Paris Law School, 61 U. PA. L. REV.
33 (1912); Layton B. Register, The Dual System of Civil and Commercial Law,
61 U. PA. L. REV. 240 (1913). He also contributed to several legal translation projects himself. See, e.g., SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD: SELECT ESSAYS BY VARIOUS
AUTHORS (Ernest Brunker & Layton B. Register trans., Boston Book Co. 1917).
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a separate civilian vocabulary in English (in the case of Register and
Lorenzen) was an informed one and more likely reflects assumptions about the nature of civil law-common law difference that were
widely-held among early 20th century American legal scholars.
Such assumptions in turn affected attitudes to perceived differences
in legal terminology as well as legal translation.
Of these assumptions, the most important was the widespread
belief (reaching then perhaps the height of its influence) that the civil
and common law traditions were more alike than previously thought
and that remaining differences were historically contingent or declining in importance. 144 The popular form of this theory likely had
its origins with Henry Sumner Maine’s “Roman Law and Legal Education,” first published in the 1856 Cambridge Essays and included
in later editions of Village-communities in the East and West (1871),
in which the English legal historian argued that the world’s two great
legal systems, English law and Roman law, were becoming more
alike as English law followed a similar trajectory of historical development. 145 Moreover, the British Empire’s rapid commercial and
Lorenzen is better known for his work on conflicts of law, but he also wrote several articles on Roman, civil, and comparative law and was an occasional contributor to both American and French comparative law journals. See, e.g., Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J.
621 (1919) (comparing civil law and common law doctrines); Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, The German 1908 Law of Checks, 2 ANN. BULL. 29 (1909); see also Arthur L. Corbin, Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, 60 YALE L.J. 579, 580 (1951) (describing
Lorenzen’s academic background and interest in Roman and European comparative law). Lorenzen’s preoccupation with private international law, however, undoubtedly colored his attitudes to the potential purposes of legal comparison. By
contrast, Radin was destined for a career as a Roman and civil law scholar. See,
e.g., MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW (West Publ’g Co. 1927); Max Radin, Fundamental Concepts of Roman Law, 13 CAL. L. REV. 207 (1925).
144. See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 13 (lecture I) (arguing that Roman and English law were more similar than typically imagined and proposing numerous examples). Howe believed that historical development, rather than cultural conditions, explained most differences between national legal systems, and he thought
classical and modern civil law very similar. About Roman and American admiralty practice, Howe claimed (without any sense of hyperbole) that “[i]f the gracious shade of Ulpian could appear in a district court of the United States in an
admiralty case, he would require but a brief preparation either in principle or practice.” HOWE, supra note 56, at 48.
145. See Henry Sumner Maine, Roman Law and Legal Education, in
CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 1, 2 (1856):
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colonial expansion brought English lawyers into renewed contact
with civilian systems and encouraged English lawyers to think of
English and Roman law as the twin foundations of world law. By
1901, James Bryce was predicting that, though neither system was
likely “to overpower or absorb the other” in geopolitical terms, it
was nevertheless possible that “they may draw nearer, and that out
of them there may be developed, in the course of ages, a system of
rules of private law which shall be practically identical as regards
contracts and property and civil wrongs . . . .” 146 A generation later,
Radin himself stated that, “[t]he most obvious movement in law at
the present time is the gradual assimilation which is taking place
between the modified Roman law of most modern countries and the
only system that can pretend to rival it, the common law of England,
the United States, Canada and Australia.” 147
The idea that English law and Roman law were growing more
alike was initially rooted in abstract (and often erroneous) theories
of the common law’s historical development, but political events
during the period tended to lend credibility to such explanations.
Among these was the steady development of mixed legal systems,

It is not because our own jurisprudence and that of Rome were once alike
that they ought to be studied together – it is because they will be alike. It
is because all laws, however dissimilar in their infancy, tend to resemble
each other in their maturity; and because we in England are slowly, and
perhaps unconsciously or unwillingly, but still steadily and certainly accustoming ourselves to the same modes of legal thought and to the same
conceptions of legal principle to which the Roman jurisconsults had attained after centuries of accumulated experience and unwearied cultivation (emphasis in original).
See also HENRY SUMNER MAINE, VILLAGE-COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND
WEST 332-33 (3d ed., H. Holt 1880). But see Michele Graziadei, Changing
Images of the Law in XIX Century English Legal Thought, in THE RECEPTION
OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 1820-1920 (Mathias
Reimann ed., Duncker & Humblot 1993) (examining 19th century trends in
English legal history and their effects on perceptions of similarity/difference
with continental legal systems and stating that assumptions of a close (historical) relationship between Roman and English law were already in decline by
last quarter of 19th century).
146. JAMES BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 122-23 (Oxford
U. Press 1901).
147. RADIN, supra note 143, at 101.
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both in the British Empire as a result of 18th and 19th century imperial growth (for example, in Lower Canada and the Cape Colony),
as well as in the United States’ new insular territories (such as Puerto
Rico, the Philippines, and, briefly, Panama). The creation of these
systems, which generally combined English (or American) public
law and some form of modern civil law, suggested the interchangeability or compatibility of civil and common law systems, or at least
the declining significance of civil law-common law distinctions. At
the very most, bijural mixing promised new opportunities for judges
to select the best rules from each tradition to create a third, superior,
system, a project not unrelated to the original goals of European
comparative law. 148 In this spirit, R.W. Lee, a Roman-Dutch scholar
with practical and academic experience in the legal systems of Quebec and Ceylon, pronounced in 1915 that “we are at the end of the
time in which it is still possible to contemplate the Civil Law and
the Common Law as separate and self-contained entities . . . . They
are becoming assimilated.” 149 The French comparatist Henri LévyUllmann came to a similar conclusion in an article reviewing the
development of another mixed jurisdiction, Scotland. LévyUllmann happily predicted that the future “law of the civilised nations” would be, like Scots law, a “combination between the AngloSaxon system and the continental system.” 150

148. Cf. Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Cultural Voices of Judges and Jurist:
Purists, Pragmatists, and Pollutionists, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE,
supra note 11, at 41 (associating this view of the mixed jurisdictions as “laboratories of comparative law” with “pragmatists”).
149. R.W. Lee, Civil Law and Common Law: A World Survey, 14 MICH. L.
REV. 89, 100 (1915) (“The law of the future, like the first man fashioned by Prometheus, will consist of particles gathered from every side, will be as composite
as an English plum pudding.”). Others were more skeptical about Roman-Dutch
law’s capacity for survival against the onslaught of English common law’s global
expansion. See, e.g., F.W. MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE 31
(Cambridge U. Press 1901) (Rede lecture) (stating that “the so-called ‘Roman
Dutch’ law of certain outlying parts of the British Empire now stands alone, and
few, I imagine, would foretell for it a brilliant future . . . .”).
150. Henri Lévy-Ullmann, Law of Scotland, 37 JURID. REV. 370, 390 (1925).
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American comparatists soon put such theories to use in their own
Pan-American context. In the Virginia Law Review’s very first article, Hannis Taylor, following Bryce, argued that it was “hard to
overestimate the importance of the fusion now going on between
Roman private and English public law in the state systems of Latin
America,” a reference to the mix of private law and republican forms
of government in the independent republics of South America. 151
Extrapolating from Latin American examples to a more global perspective, Taylor asked his readers rhetorically, “[W]ho is willing to
deny that out of this fusion of Roman private and English public law
there is arising throughout the world a new and composite state system, whose outer shell is English constitutional law, including jury
trials in criminal cases, and whose interior code is Roman private
law?”152 For those in doubt, Taylor argued that Louisiana showed
what could be accomplished. As early as 1899, he told the state’s
bar that their mixed jurisprudence was an “epitome of all that is best
in the past, and as an index finger that points to the ultimate form
which the state system of the Western Hemisphere may possibly assume.” 153
For Bureau founder William Smithers, the two opportunities for
legal mixing presented by the new insular possessions and the PanAmerican movement were directly-related. In 1909, Smithers gleefully announced that the mixing of Spanish civil and Anglo-American common law in the United States was leading to the “inauguration of a distinct system to be known as American law” which would
“draw perfection from every juridical, philosophical, ethical and political source . . .” available, irrespective of national origin. 154 Two
years later, he touted the benefits of better knowledge of Hispanic
151. Hannis Taylor, The Jurisprudence of Latin America, 1 VA. L. REV. 1, 13
(1913).
152. Id.
153. Hannis Taylor, A Comparative Study of Roman and English Law, in the
Old World and the New, 7 AM. LAW. 473, 476 (1899).
154. William W. Smithers, Comparative Law as a Practical Science 5 (1909)
(paper given at Pennsylvania Bar Association meeting).

142

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 11

legal systems so that the Hispanic world’s civil law systems might
“be amalgamated with the Common Law and later American legislation.” 155 Perceptions that the uniform state law movement held out
an important opportunity for commercial integration during a period
of national economic expansion likewise reinforced assumptions
that comparison’s primary utility was to mitigate the myriad (usually commercial) inconveniences of legal diversity. It is significant
that several comparatists considered here, including Smithers and
Walton, were supporters of the uniform state law movement and that
Lobingier twice proposed extending the movement’s successes to
the Philippines. 156 In addition, Register’s writings appear to suggest
that his own interest in comparison centered on the promise of harmonizing systems, while Lorenzen’s interests in private international law reflect a similar hermeneutic. 157
From far parts of the globe, American colonial judges also
joined voices such as Taylor’s and Smithers’ by insisting that legal
blending was not only feasible but that legal difference could be
overcome with facility. In particular, several American territorial
judges in the Philippines argued that they were witnessing legal convergence between the civil law and the common law in their own
courtrooms and boasted that the process was proceeding without incident. For example, Charles Lobingier, a trial judge sitting on the
Court of First Instance in Manila, wrote in 1911 that the task of
155. William W. Smithers, Latin America, 3 ANN. BULL. 14, 15 (1911) (explicitly linking comparison and Pan-Americanism).
156. See William W. Smithers, Editorial Miscellany, 3 ANN. BULL. 10 (1910)
(“The educative force of the many years devoted to uniform legislation has not
only secured national recognition for that work, but aroused a sense of appreciation, both lay and professional, to the advantages of comparative law study generally.”); Charles S. Lobingier, Civil Law Rights through Common Law Remedies,
20 JURID. REV. 97 (1908) (recommending the extension of uniform state law
movement to Philippines); Charles S. Lobingier, Codification in the Philippines,
3 ANN. BULL. 42 (1910) (similar) [hereinafter Lobingier, Codification].
157. In general, Register never liked a civil law system better than when it was
in the process of adopting common-law methods. See, e.g., Layton B. Register,
Judicial Powers of Interpretation under Foreign Codes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 39,
50 (1916) (expressing cautious optimism that Swiss Civil Code of 1912’s preliminary title had opened door to greater use of case law as supplementary legal authority).
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American courts in that colony had been to “adjust, harmonize and
blend the two distinct systems.” 158 Clearly satisfied with the progress made over the previous decade, Lobingier told fellow Bureau
members that “the experiment has demonstrated the feasibility of
blending segments of the Civil and the Common (Anglo-American)
law, the two systems which divide the civilized world, thus confirming the view that at root the two are really one.” 159
Assumptions that civil law-common law difference was illusory
or declining in importance soon had a predictable impact on attitudes to civilian terminology. English-speaking civil law scholars,
in their efforts to explain allegedly superficial distinctions between
the two systems, frequently promoted the idea that such distinctions
were principally limited to differences in procedure and vocabulary,
rather than substance. For example, in his widely-read Studies in the
Civil Law, Howe had argued that the “difference between the civil
law and the common law is by no means so great as some persons
imagine . . . . There are differences of terminology, which, to some,
seem strange and alien, but when they are once understood, the leading doctrines are found to be much the same.” 160 In fact, Howe told
his readers, the common law’s “technical terms” largely covered the
same “topics” of the civil law. 161 In the opinion of Sir Frederick Pollock, “[t]he more we look into other civilized [i.e., non-English]
modern laws, the more we shall find that under all differences of
terminology and procedure the results come out not much unlike.” 162
158. Lobingier, Juridical Fusion, supra note 13, at 38-39. See also the comments of American colonial judge George Malcolm a few years later, which are
very similar. Philippine Law, 11 ILL. L. REV. 331, 332 (1917) (“The two great
streams of the law, the civil, the legacy of Rome to Spain coming from the west,
and the common, the inheritance of the United States from Great Britain coming
from the east, have here in the Philippines, met and blended.”).
159. Lobingier, Codification, supra note 156, at 41-42 (citing BRYCE, supra
note 146, at 122-23).
160. HOWE, supra note 13, at 149 (emphasis supplied).
161. Id. at 8.
162. Frederick Pollock, Genius of the Common Law, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 660,
661 (1912).
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It is interesting to note that Pollock’s comment was followed
with the claim that, “[n]o sane and impartial man will believe that in
the main there is not as good justice in Edinburgh as in London, or
at Montreal as at Toronto,” a clear reference to two mixed systems
(Scotland and Quebec). 163 Indeed, it was evidence from the mixed
systems that convinced many that vocabularies were the last to
merge in the process of legal convergence. Thus, Lee, predicting
that the civil law and common law were blending on a global scale,
claimed that the two traditions’ “assimilation will, before very long,
be complete, the difference, if any remains, being a difference rather
of terminology than of substance,” a conclusion similar to Pollock’s. 164 Likewise, in an article reviewing the common law’s rapid
global spread, Roscoe Pound (yet another early Bureau member) described the outlier Louisiana as a “common-law system in all but its
terminology” and stated elsewhere that “[e]xcept as it lingers in their
legal vocabulary, the Scotch have almost abandoned Roman law in
all their courts.” 165 In The Spirit of the Common Law, Pound cast
significant doubt on the civil law’s very survival in the mixed systems, apart from their unique legal lexicons, when he stated that
“[i]n the Philippines and in Porto Rico there are many signs that
common-law administration of a Roman code will result in a system
Anglo-American in substance if Roman-Spanish in its terms.”166
Comments such as these suggest a prevalent suspicion that civilian
vocabularies were holdovers of a past era of legal diversity. Moreover, the emphasis on terminology as the principal locus of difference
or the fading indicia of a divided past was clearly a consistent theme
for many English-speaking scholars of the period and one that reflected their specific historical and political circumstances.

163. Id. at 661-62.
164. Lee, supra note 149, at 100.
165. Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 18 GREEN BAG 17, 17-18
(1906) (citations omitted).
166. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 2 (Marshall Jones Co.
1921).
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By contrast, it was among those comparatists who emphasized
civil law-common law difference in their scholarship (law professors such as Borchard and Sherman) or who expressed skepticism
about the speed of the hypothesized global legal convergence (such
as the colonial judge Peter Hamilton) that criticism of Walton’s
translation, and praise of Joannini’s and Wheless’s, was most reliably encountered. 167
V. CONCLUSIONS
Scholars of comparative law have frequently noted the important
role that intellectual history and global politics have played in the
discipline’s development, both in terms of its scholarly ambitions
and its fundamental assumptions. 168 The history of English-speaking comparison in particular is replete with examples (some dating
to the early modern period) of the impact of contemporary trends in
politics and ideology on English and American attitudes to the civil
law tradition. 169 Indeed, shifting priorities in domestic politics and
167. See, e.g., Peter J. Hamilton, The Civil Law and the Common Law, 36
HARV. L. REV. 180, 190 & n.25 (1922) (expressing more-skeptical stance to rapid
civil law-common law convergence, criticizing Walton’s translation of causa as
consideration); Charles P. Sherman, Salient Features of the Argentine Law of
Sale, 14 ILL. L. REV. 617, 618 & n.9 (1920) (praising Joannini’s translation as a
“splendid work”); Charles P. Sherman, Salient Features of the Brazilian Law of
Sale, 42 CAN. L. TIMES 648, 650 & n. 4 (1922) (praising Wheless’s translation as
a “most excellent and scholarly work”); see also Edwin M. Borchard, Some Lessons from the Civil Law, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 570, 581 (1916) (emphasizing substantive differences between civil law and common law systems, in particular use
of stare decisis).
168. See, e.g., Gerhard Danneman, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or
Differences?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 386-89 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press 2006) (discussing
20th-century comparative law’s emphasis on legal convergence); see also Maria
Pargendler, The Rise and Decline of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043,
1062-73 (2012) (describing 19th-century globalization’s effects on comparative
thought and stating that “[i]n the rapidly globalizing world of the nineteenth-century, early comparatists seemed less concerned with measuring differences across
legal systems than with paving the way for legal convergence. The purpose of
most comparative works was to search for common ground amidst apparent diversity.”).
169. See BRIAN P. LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND, 1603-1641: A
POLITICAL STUDY (Clarendon Press 1973), ch. 3-5 (examining the relationship
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intellectual history have often shaped common law views of the civil
law tradition in either positive (when viewed as a scientific or universal system) or negative directions (when viewed as fundamentally foreign). 170 As the degree of difference between the two systems has taken on important implications for European legal integration, what had once been a particular preoccupation of Englishspeaking legal scholars has become an important concern and point
of debate among European comparatists as well. 171
The turn of the last century was one such moment in the cyclical
history of changing common law attitudes to the civil law tradition,
particularly in American comparative thought. Both Pan-Americanism’s emphasis on uniform commercial legislation and legal mixing
in the new insular possessions created heightened expectations of
legal convergence across the civil law-common law frontier, though
between political ideology and Puritan/Royalist attitudes to English civil law tradition during period leading up to Civil War); Luigi Moccia, English Attitudes to
the Civil Law, 2 J. LEG. HIST. 157, 159-60, 164 (1981) (arguing that “traditional,
‘antagonistic’ attitude of common lawyers towards ‘civil law’ . . . finds an explanation in [17th century] English constitutional history . . . .”); see also Peter Stein,
The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REV.
403, 407-14 (1966) (discussing early 19th century American lawyers’ interest in
civil law tradition and attributing use of civil law to variety of practical and intellectual factors).
170. Compare Daniel R. Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation I: The
English Civilian Writers, 1523-1607, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1981) (noting
traditional Whig/common-law associations of the civil law tradition in general
with royal absolutism), and HOWE, supra note 56, at 37 (“[W]e may all admit that
down to times long after those of Blackstone the civil law was associated in the
minds of many Englishmen with a system that was thought to be most hostile and
alien to the liberties of England.”), with R.H. Helmholz, Continental Law and
Common Law: Historical Strangers or Companions?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1207,
1224-26 (1990) (discussing early American perceptions of civil law as closer to
natural law and universal legal principles and concluding that during period
“[n]either English nor American lawyers seemed to regard the division between
common law and civil law as an absolute and unbridgeable gulf.”), and M.H.
Hoeflich, Comparative Law in Antebellum America, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD.
L. REV. 535, 536 (2005) (stating that, “by the second decade of the nineteenth
century, the English common law was widely seen as the legal system of a tyrannous enemy regime,” identifying this attitude as one of several “reasons for American jurists to look at other legal systems . . . .” for answers to legal problems).
171. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging,
45 INT’L L. & COMP. L.Q. 52, 64 (1996) (arguing that, despite European comparatists’ de-emphasis of civil law-common law difference in support of EU’s project
of legal integration, the two traditions are “irreducibly different”).
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in different contexts. Political developments in both spheres of activity prompted ideologically-motivated justifications for such convergence, including the proposition that future mixed systems would
be stronger or combine the best of both traditions. 172 Indeed, overcoming civil law-common law difference was inherent to both processes, and the expansion of English common law at the civil law’s
expense in the bijural systems had additional implications for perceptions of difference in legal terminology.
That perceptions of civil law-common law difference might
have affected contemporary attitudes to legal translation of civilian
concepts into English should hardly be surprising given the close
relationship between legal English and the common law tradition.173
The stakes are particularly high in mixed jurisdictions where English-speaking judges and lawyers may unknowingly import common
law doctrines into civilian jurisprudence via the use of legal English, 174 and the possibility of injury to the civilian interpretative
framework is also suggested when we recall that “the language of a
civil code in particular, is also a technical and scientific language.” 175 In response, several scholars of Louisiana’s civil law tradition caution strongly against such translation approaches and argue convincingly that it is possible to express the civil law in English
without adopting the terms and concepts of the common law.176
172. See, e.g., José Trías Monge, Legal Methodology in Some Mixed Jurisdictions, 78 TUL. L. REV. 333, 349-50 (2003) (arguing that American colonial judges
embraced “Fantasy of the Wise Mix” and “Fantasy of the Unification of Law” as
ideological justifications for introduction of common law concepts into early 20th
century Puerto Rican and Filipino jurisprudence).
173. See GUTTERIDGE, supra note 1, at 117-18; Rotman, supra note 1, at 189;
Moréteau, supra note 1, at 706-09; Levasseur & Feliú supra note 1, at 735.
174. See, e.g., T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition, in CIVIL
LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 16 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed. 1965) (“[L]et
me stress that mixed legal systems which use English as the language of the courts
are particularly exposed to subversion through imposition or incautious acceptance of technical terms of Anglo-American common lawyers as equivalents
to civilian concepts. A torrent of alien jurisprudence can pour through the
breaches thus made.”).
175. ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE: SOURCES OF LAW
AND METHODS OF INTERPRETATION 61 (2015).
176. See, e.g., Levasseur & Feliú, supra note 1, at 717 (arguing that:
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Alain Levasseur and Vicenç Feliú in particular have stated that the
Louisiana Civil Code’s 200-year history is proof that a “uniform”
and “consistent” translation into English of civil law concepts of
similar lexical origin is feasible, regardless of whether the source
language is Spanish or French. 177 Elsewhere, Levasseur and Randall
Trahan argue for the special importance of “securing the survival of
the civil law tradition in general by anchoring it in the English language and not just any English language, but an English language
different from the English language of the common law.” 178
Against this backdrop, Joannni’s use of Louisiana’s special civilian vocabulary at the turn of the last century appears remarkably
prescient. It is perhaps also ironic that his resort to Louisiana’s special legal lexicon came at a period in time when that state’s future
identity as a civilian jurisdiction was itself in doubt, a historical moment reflected in Pound’s assumption of the common law’s total triumph there. 179 Moreover, the attention to the subtle nuances of civil
law-common law difference embraced by Levasseur, Feliú, and Trahan may reflect a high degree of concern for keeping the two tradi-

[T]here is no need to resort to the legal vocabulary found in the Common
Law of England to express the ‘civil law in English.’ Actually, we are
issuing a strong warning against any such attempt. The survival of the
civil law system in the English language of the Louisiana Civil Code
since 1808 is a vivid testimony that the civil law can exist in ‘English’
as long as it is an English that has been tested and tried in a civil law
environment.);
see also Agustín Parise, A Translator’s Toolbox: The Law, Moreau-Lislet’s Library, and the Presence of Multilingual Dictionaries in Nineteenth-Century Louisiana, 76 LA. L. REV. 1163, 1164-65 (2016) (stating that “[s]cholars both of Continental European and common law systems may look to Louisiana for civil law
terminology in English” and arguing that “scholars should esteem the more than
200-year-old tradition of English language civil law codification in Louisiana.”).
177. Levasseur & Feliú, supra note 1, at 735.
178. Alain A. Levasseur & J. Randall Trahan, Our Approach to Translation,
in GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE xiv (Alain Levasseur & Marie-Eugénie Laporte-Legeais trans., Lexis Nexis 2014).
179. See, e.g., A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law: A Lost Cause?, 54
TUL. L. REV. 830, 833-34 (1980) (reviewing perceptions of Louisiana lawyers of
the 1910s-1930s that the state was no longer a predominantly civilian jurisdiction).
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tions separate as independent sources of jurisprudence. At a minimum, they suggest the worldview of the “purist” or “pragmatist”
rather than the “pollutionist.” 180 Yet in some eras, legal pollution
has been regarded as a virtue, and the difference between pollution
and pragmatism has become obscured or contested as particular ideological requirements shifted.
F.L. Joannini worked in such an era. Yet, despite comparatist
crosscurrents to the contrary, he remained resolutely sensitive to the
implications of legal diversity across numerous translations spanning more than a decade. If, as has been argued here, his contemporaries viewed civil law-common law difference as a matter of terminology and procedure, rather than substance, then it is not surprising
that some reviewers were relatively indifferent to the risks inherent
in translating civilian concepts into legal English. Certainly, such
critics were not likely to welcome the preservation of allegedly superficial civil law-common law distinctions through the introduction
or incorporation of unique civilian English terms. This would be especially true if they shared the assumption of some legal scholars
that terms such as compensation, transaction, and dation survived
only as civilian fig-leaves for nakedly universal legal categories.
Such attitudes may also help explain the mix of positive and negative reviews for Joannini’s Argentine Civil Code translation and that
of Wheless after him. Indeed, the fact that in a slightly-different context Clifford Walton took a radically divergent approach and largely
escaped criticism for it suggests how unpredictable opinions on civil
law-common law difference were at the beginning of the last century.
“Translation illustrates the inseparability of law and language,
and the field of translation is an extraordinarily rich source for insights into the process of comparison,” states one comparatist

180. See Palmer, supra note 148, at 39-44 (offering a paradigm for mixed jurisdiction “purists” and “pollutionists”).
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scholar. 181 In the case of Joannini’s Spanish-English civil code
translations, both the translator’s method and contemporary comparatist reviews are indeed “rich sources.” Each provides us with a
glimpse of early 20th century comparatist perceptions of civil lawcommon law difference at a critical moment in the history of PanAmericanism and in the evolution of this country’s current and former mixed legal systems. Joannini’s embrace of the special civilian
language of the Louisiana Civil Code also demonstrates yet another
way in which that state’s civil law tradition has served as a vehicle
for U.S.-Latin American legal comparison. 182

181. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 54 (1998).
182. See, e.g., Parise, Hispanic Codifications, supra note 106 (describing influence of Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 on 19th-century Latin American codifications).

